This paper provides novel empirical insights into the Porter hypothesis (PH) and its dynamic nature. The PH posits that well-designed environmental regulations induce eco-innovations at polluting firms that improve both their environmental and business performance via 'innovation offsets. ' We conduct an econometric test of this proposition, using Swedish pulp and paper plants as empirical application. Swedish environmental regulation of polluting industries provides an interesting case because it has been praised, due to containing elements of 'well-designed' regulations, for being conducive to accomplishing the 'win-win' situation of mutual environmental and economic benefits. The empirical results indicate that flexible and dynamic command-and-control regulation and economic incentive instruments have induced innovation offsets through improved energy efficiency. Our study bears important implications: empirical tests of the PH that do not account for its dynamic nature, and that do not measure 'well-designed' regulations, might provide misleading conclusions as to its validity.
Introduction
Swedish environmental regulation of polluting industries has been praised for its ability to reconcile environmental protection goals with the maintenance of polluting industries' competitiveness, by stimulating regulated firms to adopt clean production technologies with a 'win-win' potential of simultaneously creating environmental and economic benefits (Porter and Van der Linde 1995b; Lindmark and Bergquist 2008; Bergquist and Söderholm 2010; Bergquist et al. 2013) . As a result, the Swedish case can be considered a role model of the Porter hypothesis (PH), which posits that well-designed environmental regulation can boost firms' innovation activities such that the net cost of regulatory compliance is partially or more than fully offset -and that these 'innovation offsets' may result in a competitive advantage over those firms not subject to such environmental standards (Porter and Van der Linde 1995a) . Offsets in Swedish polluting firms can be expected to materialize because KEYWORDS Porter hypothesis; well-designed regulation; command-and-control; economic instruments; polluting industries; innovation offsets; win-win; double dividend clean production technologies have the advantage that they, on top of being environmentally benign, can yield productivity benefits for the firm as opposed to unproductive 'end-of-pipe' investments (Porter and Van der Linde 1995a; Perman et al. 2003; Requate 2005; Kemp and Pontoglio 2011) .
The PH's key message is that to achieve an environmental and economic 'win-win' , regulations need to be well-crafted. The major regulatory properties highlighted by Porter and Van der Linde (1995a) include uncertainty avoidance, regulatory predictability and flexibility, all from the perspective of the regulated firm, and coordination (regulator-polluter, regulator-regulator), without jeopardizing regulatory stringency. Swedish environmental regulation of polluting industries is said to contain properties of such a well-designed regulatory approach for at least two reasons. First, it features flexible command-and-control (CAC) regulation focusing on environmentally and economically beneficial production process reconfigurations made possible by flexible plant-specific emission limit values and uncertainty-reducing or predictability-enhancing probation periods for plants to test and introduce new technologies, rather than rigid technology prescriptions and end-of-pipe solutions often seen in North American environmental regulation (Porter and Van der Linde 1995b; Harrison 2002) . Second, it contains cost-efficient and flexible economic incentive instruments including taxes and charges levied on industrial air emissions, industry grants for new environmental technology, and an emission trading scheme (Swedish Code of Statutes 2003b; SEPA 2007) . 1 Numerous studies have tested the PH empirically, with Wagner (2003) , Brännlund and Lundgren (2009) , Ambec et al. (2011) , and Koźluk and Zipperer (2015) comprehensively reviewing the literature at the firm, industry and nation-level. The tests of the PH can be divided into three broad categories: tests of the PH's 'weak' version (i.e. the link between regulation and innovation; tests of its 'strong' version (i.e. the link between regulation and performance/competitiveness; and tests of the 'narrow' version of the PH, that is, the specific performance effects of 'well-designed' regulations (Jaffe and Palmer 1997) . This paper aims to test the so far scarcely explored narrow version of the PH (Koźluk and Zipperer 2015; Albrizio, Kozluk, and Zipperer 2017) . Its empirical application is Swedish regulation of air emissions of the most pollution-intensive Swedish pulp and paper plants, observed during the period 1999-2011. The pulp and paper industry (PPI) constitutes highly relevant case in that context given its air pollution and energy intensity (European Commission 2001; International Energy Agency 2007; Kramer et al. 2009 ).
The study contributes to the literature on the PH in several ways, which are outlined in more detail in Section 2.3. One major contribution is related to the choice of variables proxying environmental regulation: Many previous studies on the PH aim to judge the PH's validity by proxying environmental regulation using firms' environmental compliance costs, although such a proxy does not adequately measure regulatory stringency let alone other elements of a well-designed regulatory mix (Berman and Bui 2001; Brännlund and Lundgren 2009; Ambec et al. 2011; Botta and Koźluk 2014) . We account for this econometric issue of identifying well-designed regulation, including regulatory stringency, by 1 swedish regulation is moreover known for coordinated and trusting relationships between regulator and industry, for instance, in the form of long-standing regulator-firm collaboration in environmental r&d (Lönnroth 2010; Bergquist et al. 2013) , which is in line with the PH's postulations. this, however, is not an explicit theoretical or empirical focus of this article, due to limitations in terms of scope and data. neither does the theoretical framework capture intra-regulator coordination; another feature of the PH. the tests control for intra-regulator coordination (or lack thereof), though (cf. sections 3 and 4).
using dummy variables to indicate single policy events, thereby empirically disentangling 'well-designed' Swedish regulation into two of its major constituents in line with the PH: Swedish command-and-control (CAC) regulation and regulation via economic incentive instruments. Swedish CAC regulation, which is based on stringent but cost-efficient and innovation-inducing plant performance standards, rather than inflexible technology standards, is modeled via a dummy that captures a CAC regulatory event in the context of a plant's production capacity expansion between two consecutive years; such an expansion needs to be approved by Swedish environmental courts (Swedish Code of Statutes 1998b; SEPA 2002; OECD 2007) . Regulation via economic incentive instruments is modeled using year dummies that capture 12 major policy events in this regulatory field identified during the study period (see also Sections 3.2 and 3.4). The unraveling of these two regulatory types moreover provides insights into the environmental economics literature by analyzing the effectiveness of each of these regulatory building blocks in inducing innovation offsets at regulated firms (Requate 2005; Kemp and Pontoglio 2011; Bergquist et al. 2013) . In that context, our methodological approach also allows for testing the PH's dynamic dimension (by specifying time lags): According to Porter, it can take some time until properly crafted environmental regulations will become manifest in innovations and innovation offsets; yet the empirical literature often does not account for these dynamics empirically (Ambec et al. 2011; Broberg et al. 2013 ).
2
A second major contribution is that we provide evidence of whether recent environmental policy in a country that, as outlined, is renowned for incorporating elements of properly crafted regulations in the spirit of the PH has indeed been effective in inducing innovation offsets at polluting plants. So far, empirical studies have been biased toward the U.S., a country whose environmental regulation includes rather inflexible technology standards, so that finding evidence on the PH might be comparably difficult (Harrison 2002; Wagner 2003; Brännlund and Lundgren 2009; Ambec et al. 2011; Botta and Koźluk 2014) Empirical evidence on the Swedish case is scarce; exceptions are Brännlund and Lundgren (2010) and Broberg et al. (2013) , which both do not find support of performance-enhancing Swedish regulation. Our paper differs from these two studies by analyzing the regulation-performance link in a more comprehensive and systematic way in terms of the modeling of 'well-designed' Swedish regulation. Brännlund and Lundgren (2010) only test performance effects of the Swedish carbon dioxide (CO 2 ) tax. Broberg et al. (2013) use environmental protection investments as a proxy for environmental stringency, which, as discussed, can cause issues of identification.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 outlines the PH, and critically reviews previous empirical evidence in that context. We conclude the section by formulating general testable hypotheses. Section 3 provides a background of the PPI and of 'well-designed' Swedish regulation of polluting industries. It also presents the data and variables used in the empirical analysis as well as the pulp empirical strategy. Section 4 presents and discusses the econometric results, and Section 5 concludes.
'Win-win' environmental regulation

The Porter hypothesis
There has been a long-lasting environmental policy debate on the suitability of pollution control instruments in satisfying static efficiency (i.e. cost efficiency) and dynamic efficiency (i.e. development and adoption of environmental technologies) efficiency; two policy criteria that matter from an economic point of view (Perman et al. 2003; Requate 2005; Kemp and Pontoglio 2011) . The current consensus, particularly regarding dynamic efficiency, is that a policy focus on individual pollution control instruments might be misleading. Instead, optimal dynamic incentives for polluting agents could be ensured by means of a well-crafted policy portfolio or regulatory design (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2005; Johnstone, Hascic, and Kalamova 2010; Kemp and Pontoglio 2011) .
Harvard professor Michael Porter has long advocated the relevance of 'well-designed' environmental regulations for accomplishing dynamic, as well as static, efficiency gains. On top of that, he set a third hitherto neglected economic criterion on the environmental policy agenda: policy's ability to ensure a 'double dividend' of simultaneous environmental and economic benefits. 3 The standard neoclassical paradigm of profit maximization has traditionally denied the existence of a 'double dividend, ' considering compliance to environmental standards a cost driver and thus detrimental to polluting firms' competitiveness (Palmer, Oates, and Portney 1995) . Porter, in his controversially debated Porter hypothesis (PH), questioned this alleged trade-off. Based on case study evidence, he argued that 'well-designed' environmental regulations may not only improve environmental quality but also enhance firms' innovative capabilities such that net regulatory costs might be more than fully offset: a 'win-win' situation. Such 'innovation offsets, ' in turn, may ultimately entail a competitive edge over more leniently regulated firms Van der Linde 1995a, 1995b) .
Porter and Van der Linde (1995a) mention various properties that environmental regulations should contain to bring about innovation offsets at regulated firms. One is related to regulatory stringency and flexibility (see also Johnstone, Hascic, and Kalamova 2010) : The regulator should exert pressure, improve firms' environmental awareness, and set clear environmental goals, while letting firms themselves decide on how to approach the innovations necessary to achieve these goals. The authors are explicit though on that the regulator should not prescribe costly and unproductive end-of-pipe solutions but product and process improvements, which potentially induce offsets through enhanced resource productivityand which reduce pollution at an early stage. This approach should involve granting firms phase-in and probation periods -during which they can assess new technologies in terms of their economic and environmental benefits -to help reduce the uncertainty surrounding firms' investment decisions (Dixit and Pindyck 1994; Pindyck 2007; Bergquist et al. 2013) . Another major property is that the regulatory mix should include the use of market incentives, such as pollution taxes and tradable emission permits, instead of technology standards. These instruments ensure flexibility while stimulating ongoing innovation and continuous improvement processes (Perman et al. 2003; Requate 2005) . Flexibility in principle, too, is ensured by performance standards, which are also called emission limit values, because 3 Cf. also Perman et al. (2003) .
the firm itself must decide on how to reach a given emission target (Kemp and Pontoglio 2011) .
4 Figure 1 illustrates the PH.
Empirical literature on the Porter hypothesis
The PH has been subject to numerous empirical tests at various levels of analysis (firm, industry and nation-level). Extensive reviews on the PH have been provided by Wagner (2003) , Lundgren (2009), Ambec et al. (2011) , and Koźluk and Zipperer as outlined in the introductory section, this study does not explicitly focus on Porter and van der Linde's (1995a) 'coordination' property due to limitations in terms of scope and data. the authors argue that environmental regulation should be coordinated, among others, between regulators and industry, and between regulators at various levels of government. this argument emphasizes the importance of an effective interplay of a country's institutional setup, which consists of formal and informal 'rules of the game' and the organizations (i.e. polluting firms) subject to that setup (north 1990) . this includes public-private partnerships via common environmental r&d projects aimed at reducing market failures implied by knowledge spillovers, adoption externalities, investment uncertainty and information asymmetry (Jaffe, newell, and stavins 2005) .
(2015). The literature on the original PH can be categorized into three major strands: (i) tests of the 'weak' version of the PH, that is, the effect of environmental regulation on innovation, R&D and investment; (ii) tests of the 'strong' version of the PH, that is, how regulation affects firm performance and competitiveness; and (iii) tests of the 'narrow' version of the PH, that is, the specific effect on innovation or performance of environmental regulations considered flexible or 'well-designed' by Porter (Jaffe and Palmer 1997) . The bulk of the empirical analyses tackles the former two, finding mixed results regarding the PH's empirical relevance. The most recent evidence of the PH using data on plants/firms -the empirical focus of our study -is provided by Van Leeuwen and Mohnen (2017) and Rexhäuser and Rammer (2014) . The former study uses a panel of Dutch manufacturing firm-level data for the period 2000-2008, strongly corroborating the weak version of the PH, and partially corroborating the PH's strong version, by finding that eco-regulations, if aimed at resource-saving eco-innovations, can have a positive effect on total factor productivity (TFP). Similarly, Rexhäuser and Rammer (2014) , using a 2009 cross-section of German firms, conclude that the strong version of PH does not hold in general, finding that only eco-regulations that stimulate efficiency-enhancing environmental innovations can provide positive effects on firm profitability. As opposed to the rich evidence on the PH's weak and strong versions, evidence on the PH's 'narrow' version is scarce (Koźluk and Zipperer 2015; Albrizio, Kozluk, and Zipperer 2017) . Exceptions include Popp (2003) who analyzes the effects of the U.S. tradable permit system for SO 2 emissions, introduced in 1990, on the technological efficiency and operating costs of flue gas desulfurization units. Using panel data on 186 plants for the period 1972-1997, he finds that regulation induced innovation, which improved SO 2 removal efficiency while lowering operating and removal costs. Brännlund and Lundgren (2010) test the effect of the Swedish CO 2 tax on manufacturing firms' productivity growth during [1990] [1991] [1992] [1993] [1994] [1995] [1996] [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] . Not finding general support of the PH, the authors conclude that while a higher CO 2 tax improves energy efficiency, negative productivity effects prevail, so that the tax may have had a crowding out effect. Lanoie, Laurent-Lucchetti, and Johnstone (2011) find that stringent performance standards increase the likelihood of an OECD manufacturing plant investing in environmental R&D, whereas pollution taxes do not. By contrast, the authors do not find a significant direct effect neither of stringent performance standards nor of taxes on business performance. The most recent evidence on the PH's narrow version is provided by Albrizio, Kozluk, and Zipperer (2017) who find market-based environmental policies to be more productivity-friendly than non-market instruments.
Evidence on the Porter hypothesis: a critical review
Given the mixed evidence provided by previous empirical tests of the PH, given the lack of evidence regarding the PH's narrow version, and to highlight the specific literature contributions of our paper, a critical discussion of the literature on the PH is warranted. We limit this discussion to tests which, in line with our study, are based on firm/plant-level data.
First and foremost, as Brännlund and Lundgren (2009) note, many empirical tests of the PH use proxy variables for environmental regulation that may not truly capture neither regulatory stringency nor the elements that, according to Porter, a well-designed regulatory mix should contain to induce environmental innovation and innovation offsets. This may explain the lack of consensus in the literature as to the PH's validity, particularly concerning the effect of regulations on business performance. A regulation proxy often used is firms' or industries' costs of complying with regulation, also known as pollution and abatement control expenditures (PACE). There are two common reasons for why using PACE may confound estimation results, by not adequately reflecting compliance costs: measurement error and heterogeneity bias (Berman and Bui 2001; Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003) . As for the former, Berman and Bui (2001) , for example, argue that environmental regulation can stimulate the adoption of clean and more efficient technologies, so that PACE may have a productivity-enhancing effect as well, which will result in that net regulatory costs are lower than the gross regulatory costs measured by PACE. Heterogeneity bias implies that there are factors, often unobserved, that could affect PACE, causing biased estimation results because of the endogenous nature of the PACE variable. 5 In our estimation framework, outlined in Section 3, we account for these identification issues by coding regulations as a set of dummy variables indicating single environmental policy events; a frequent practice in the empirical literature (Berman and Bui 2001; Botta and Koźluk 2014) . Using such binary indicators is advantageous because they help link performance effects directly to the respective environmental regulatory events, as opposed to regulatory proxies in the form of PACE, thereby reducing the above identification issues, particularly in the form of measurement error (Berman and Bui 2001; Botta and Koźluk 2014) . 6, 7 Such single policy event measures, in principle, suffer from the risk that de jure and de facto regulation might differ (Botta and Koźluk 2014) . In Swedish regulation, this risk could manifest itself due to the authorities' flexible interpretation of the best available technology (BAT) concept, which involves accounting for plant-specific considerations of environmental impacts and economic feasibility (see Section 3.2).
8 In our estimations, we mitigate the potential de jure -de facto regulation gap by controlling for these plant-specific considerations to the extent possible.
A second advantage with our regulation proxies is that they not only capture regulatory stringency but also reflect additional properties of 'well-designed' environmental regulation in the Porterian sense 9 : On the one hand, we disentangle regulation into its major constituents, using proxies that measure the effects both of CAC regulation and of regulation via economic incentive instruments. In this vein, we are at the same time able to provide additional empirical insights into the environmental economics literature by analyzing the effectiveness of each of these regulatory building blocks in inducing environmental innovation in the regulated firms (Perman et al. 2003; Requate 2005; Kemp and Pontoglio 2011) . On the other, our estimation framework allows for testing how flexible and uncertainty-reducing regulatory time strategies, for example in the form of extended compliance and probation periods common in Swedish regulation (Porter and Van der Linde 1995b; 5 For example, firms or industries may differ in their PaCE due to differences in the type of output they produce, plant productivity, and the degree of external pressure from external stakeholders (Berman and Bui 2001; Brunnermeier and Cohen 2003). 6 our proxy for CaC regulation moreover accounts for heterogeneity bias by modeling it as an endogenously chosen dummy variable a part of a treatment-effects econometric framework (cf. section 3.5).
7 Botta and Koźluk (2014) stress the disadvantages of PaCE in terms of identification, criticizing that such measures 'do not distinguish effects of environmental policies from those of other policies, firms' decisions (e.g. marketing, efficiency/profit seeking investments in capital and r&d with collateral improvement in environmental performance) and knock-on effects are ignored -e.g. as a result of regulation a firm may choose to outsource dirty production rather than invest in cleaning it. ' . Harrison 2002; Lönnroth 2010; Bergquist et al. 2013) , affect innovation offsets at regulated firms. This is closely related to the argument raised by Ambec et al. (2011) and Broberg et al. (2013) that the negative findings of many studies on the 'strong' version of the PH may be due to the fact that the PH's dynamic nature has not been sufficiently considered. More precisely, these empirical tests often lack lag structures for the regulation proxies, which rules out the reasonable conjecture that it can take time until 'learning-by-doing' (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2005; Höglund-Isaksson and Sterner 2009 ) increases the odds that a firm's eco-innovations both lead to an improved environmental performance and generate offsets in the form of an enhanced productivity. Our empirical analysis accounts for these regulation-induced innovation dynamics by specifying lags in the regressions. A third issue with many empirical tests of the PH's 'weak' version, and to some extent also its 'narrow' version, is that the variables used to measure environmental innovation (e.g. R&D expenditure) do not make any statement about innovation output, or gains from innovation (Wagner 2003; Brännlund and Lundgren 2009; Ambec et al. 2011) . Our paper aims to address this lack by using variables that measure regulation-induced environmental and economic benefits from process innovation: innovations that both reduce the negative effects of production (in our case different types of air emissions) and indicate an optimized production process, and thus cost savings (EIO 2010) . Further, many micro-level tests of the PH involve using firm-level or even industry-level data. This implies a loss of accuracy when examining environmental policy effects because regulatory instruments can be geared toward individual plants rather than firms or industries. In Sweden, for example, and as outlined in Section 3.2, CAC regulation implies plant-specific performance standards as well as a plant-specific flexible interpretation of BAT. Using Swedish plant-level data, we can account for this potential issue.
Finally, from a policy perspective, it is important to point out that empirical studies on the PH so far have been biased toward North America (Wagner 2003; Ambec et al. 2011 ); a region where environmental regulation includes rather inflexible technology standards (Harrison 2002) , so that providing evidence on the PH, and gauging its validity as a policy-making tool, is rather difficult. In addition, many tests of the PH are based on relatively old data, also because flexible regulatory instruments in the spirit of the PH have not been common until recently, and, if so, have lacked stringency (OECD 2006) . This may indeed provide a further explanation for negative or inconclusive results on the PH. Our empirical analysis uses recent Swedish data, which means that we test whether contemporary environmental policy in a country that is renowned for its well-designed regulations in the spirit of the PH has indeed been successful in inducing innovation offsets at polluting plants.
Hypotheses
We conclude our literature review by formulating four hypotheses. The first two are derived from the PH's key postulation; that well-crafted environmental regulations spur corporate innovation that triggers not only environmental benefits but also a partial or full offset of the net cost of complying with them (Porter and Van der Linde 1995a ). Our focus is on process innovation involving cleaner production technologies, which, while being environmentally benign, can lead to 'process offsets' through efficiency growth for the firm vis-à-vis unproductive 'end-of-pipe' technologies (Porter and Van der Linde 1995a; Perman et al. 2003; Requate 2005; Kemp and Pontoglio 2011) . We have argued that Swedish environmental regulation of polluting industries is very much in line with such a well-crafted regulatory design due to featuring CAC regulation based on plant-specific emission limit values including extended compliance periods rather than rigid technology standards, cost-efficient and flexible economic instruments such as pollution taxes, an emission-trading scheme, and environmental technology grants -which all satisfy the major regulatory design features stressed by the PH: uncertainty avoidance, regulatory predictability and flexibility for the regulated firm while maintaining regulatory stringency (Porter and Van der Linde 1995a; Harrison 2002; Swedish Code of Statutes 2003b; SEPA 2007) . This regulatory approach has been argued to have spurred process reconfigurations at Swedish regulated plants entaling both environmental and economic benefits (Porter and Van der Linde 1995b; Lindmark and Bergquist 2008; Bergquist and Söderholm 2010; Bergquist et al. 2013) . Given these well-designed features of Swedish regulation, and our ambition to capture them through our regulatory proxies, our analysis implies a test of the scarcely explored narrow version of the PH (Jaffe and Palmer 1997; Koźluk and Zipperer 2015; Albrizio, Kozluk, and Zipperer 2017) . Our first hypothesis, which also draws on Kemp and Pontoglio's (2011) insights, addresses the process offset potential of well-designed CAC regulation involving performance standards:
H1: Well-designed CAC regulations via plant performance standards induce process-based innovation offsets at regulated plants.
The second hypothesis, which is backed up by the mainstream environmental policy effectiveness literature (Perman et al. 2003; Requate 2005) , addresses the process offset potential of well-designed regulation involving economic incentive instruments:
H2: Well-designed regulations via economic incentive instruments induce process-based innovation offsets at regulated plants.
Hypotheses 3 and 4 go beyond the PH's key message, by testing the PH's dynamic dimension. Porter and Van der Linde (1995a) stress that it might take time until well-designed environmental regulations will trigger innovation and innovation offsets, for example, due to a necessary 'learning-by-doing' process at the regulated firm (Jaffe, Newell, and Stavins 2005; Höglund-Isaksson and Sterner 2009 ). Regarding CAC regulation, the Swedish approach has been said to account for these dynamics, for instance, by making use of probation periods (Porter and Van der Linde 1995b; Harrison 2002; Lönnroth 2010; Bergquist et al. 2013) . Hence, our next hypothesis is as follows:
H3: The effect of well-designed CAC regulations via plant performance standards on process-based innovation offsets at regulated plants is dynamic, that is, it takes time to materialize.
Finally, the PH's dynamic dimension also includes process-based innovation offsets stimulated by incentive-based regulation. Thus, we formulate the following hypothesis:
H4: The effect of well-designed regulations via economic incentive instruments on process-based innovation offsets at regulated plants is dynamic, that is, it takes time to materialize.
Data and methodology
Air pollution and environmental innovation in the pulp and paper industry
The pulp and paper industry (PPI) is an umbrella term encompassing various distinct production processes and combinations thereof. A broad categorization can be made between the pulp and the papermaking process, and between integrated and non-integrated paper and pulp mills. A non-integrated paper mill needs to purchase market pulp for producing paper, whereas a non-integrated pulp mill produces pulp for sale on the open market. Integrated paper and pulp mills combine paper and pulp production on the same site. To transform fibers into pulp and paper, mills not only require chemical additives but also consume considerable amounts of process water and energy, both thermal and electric. This turns the industry into a significant emitter of air and water pollutants, creating a large environmental footprint (cf. European Commission 2001; Kramer et al. 2009 ; and the International Energy Agency 2007 for technical details). Swedish data confirm the PPI's relevance in relation to air pollution; the focus of this study. The Swedish PPI, for example, is a large emitter of carbon dioxide (CO 2 ), standing for 15% of Swedish CO 2 emissions from industrial fossil fuel combustion in 2010 (SEPA 2012). It moreover accounts for a substantial share of Swedish manufacturing industry's emissions of ecosystem-damaging sulfur dioxide (SO 2 ) and nitrogen oxides (NO x ). For example, in 2010, pulp and paper firms stood for 35% of Swedish manufacturing industry's emissions of SO 2 , and between 1993 and 2010, their share in the industry's NO x emissions has grown from 42% to over 46%, largely due to replacing fossil fuels with biofuels (Sterner and Turnheim 2009) .
10 CO 2 , NO x and SO 2 emissions are by-products of the combustion of fossil and non-fossil fuels to produce energy. In pulp and paper mills, these pollutants are released in the context of generating heat and electricity, as well as in the processing of pulping chemicals, with the latter being specific to chemical pulp mills -which tend to be the most energy-intensive (Kramer et al. 2009 ). Air emission levels depend, among others, on the degree of a mill's energy efficiency. This, on the one hand, includes energy efficiency in more general terms -applicable across production processes and usually related to the equipment and component level (e.g. technical age of boilers), the facility level (e.g. degree of process integration) and the organizational level (e.g. implementation of energy and environmental management systems). On the other, it may involve mills' process-specific energy efficiency: their ability to, by means of process optimization and control, ensure maximum energy efficiency in their respective manufacturing process, such as raw material preparation, chemical and mechanical pulping and papermaking (cf. European Commission 2001; Kramer et al. 2009 ). Improving a mill's energy efficiency is a valid strategy from a cost-benefit perspective. While tending to entail higher upfront costs than emission control measures, it yields the potential double benefit of cutting not only pollutants but also energy costs, through reduced energy consumption (European Commission 2001; Kramer et al. 2009 ). Figure 2 illustrates trends in air emissions, total output and energy for the Swedish PPI, showing a remarkable decoupling of output and environmental impact in line with the PH (see Weiss 2015 for further details).
The Porter hypothesis in a Swedish regulatory context
Swedish environmental regulation of polluting industries such as the PPI could play a role in the PPI's decoupled growth trajectory. This is because Michael Porter himself has praised the Swedish regulatory approach for being conducive to accomplishing the double dividend of improved environmental quality and industry performance due to containing less coercive, rigid, inflexible, and unexpected elements than, for instance, North American environmental regulation Van der Linde 1995a, 1995b; Harrison 2002) . Characterized by a focus on internal process changes aimed at pollution prevention, rather than end-of-pipe treatment systems common in North America, and involving timely announcements of regulatory changes, as well as the concession of phase-in periods on the part of the regulator in terms of the adoption of BAT, the Swedish regulatory setup is said to have enabled Swedish polluting industries to adopt innovative processes that both meet emission standards and increase profitability (Porter and Van der Linde 1995b; Harrison 2002; Lönnroth 2010; Bergquist et al. 2013) .
Swedish regulation is built on two constituting pillars: CAC regulation and regulation via economic incentive instruments. As for the former, the Swedish Environmental Code (Swedish Code of Statutes 1998a) prescribes regulatory standards and BAT-levels in line with European Union legislation (European Union 2001 , 2008 , whereas regional environmental courts (in the case of the most pollution-intensive plants) and, county administrative boards (CABs) as well as district authorities (in the case of less pollution-intensive plants) issue operating licenses based on plant-specific environmental performance standards, thereby taking plant-specific considerations of environmental impacts and economic feasibility into account (Swedish Code of Statutes 1998b; SEPA 2002; OECD 2007) . Permits are issued on a temporary basis; they are revised in the context of approving production changes such as capacity expansions or when the permit is older than ten years, which often entails tightened environmental standards in line with BAT; The operative enforcement and inspection work is commonly conducted at the region-district level by CABs or municipal authorities (Swedish Code of Statutes 1998a; OECD 2007; Lönnroth 2010; Mazur 2011) . Moreover, the plants themselves must monitor environmental compliance, for instance, through the notes: total output denotes the sum of total pulp and paper production per year. the definition of the industry's net electricity and total energy use is adapted from swedish Forest Industries (2014) and computed as follows: total energy use = biofuels + fossil fuels + purchased thermal energy-sold thermal energy + purchased electricity + electricity produced on-site-sold electricity. net electricity use = purchased electricity + electricity produced on-site-sold electricity.net use of fuels and thermal energy = biofuels + fossil fuels + purchased thermal energy-sold thermal energy.
submission of environmental reports to the authorities (Swedish Code of Statutes 1998c , 1998d .
Economic instruments targeting the above-mentioned air pollutants CO 2 , SO 2 and NO x constitute the second major element of the Swedish regulatory approach. There are three instruments aimed at curbing polluting industries' CO 2 emissions: a CO 2 tax, an electricity certificate scheme, and the EU emissions trading scheme. The CO 2 tax was introduced through the Carbon Dioxide Tax Act (Swedish Code of Statutes 1990a). It is levied on all fuels, except peat and biofuels, and aims to induce energy savings and stimulate the consumption of renewable fuels (SEPA 2007) . The Electricity Certificates Act (Swedish Code of Statutes 2003a), established an electricity certificate scheme (ECS) that assigns electricity producers a certificate for each MWh of electricity generated from renewable energy sources. A market is created because electricity consumers are obliged to cover a certain percentage of their electricity consumption with 'clean' electricity. This percentage has been raised steadily since 2003, stimulating a growing demand for clean electricity and electricity certificates. The PPI, being an energy-intensive industry, is exempted from the scheme to avoid detrimental impacts on competitiveness. However, chemical pulp mills are involved in the ECS as supplier: they often use biofuels, which are residues from the pulping process, to generate heat and electricity. Therefore, the mills have an incentive to capitalize on their clean electricity production by obtaining and selling electricity certificates, while at the same time reducing CO 2 emissions (Klugman 2008 A major tool for abating SO 2 emissions has been the sulfur tax (Hammar and Löfgren 2001; SEPA 2007) . In force since 1991 (Swedish Code of Statutes 1990b), the tax is meant to curb consumption of sulfur-intensive fuels. Manufacturing industry's SO 2 emissions have decreased, among others, through realizing energy efficiency improvements (SEPA 2007). The major economic instrument for NO x emission control is the NO x charge. In force since 1992 (Swedish Code of Statutes 1990c), the charge is levied on NO x emissions from stationary combustion units and gas turbines, as well as from production plants at which hot oil, hot water or steam is produced. Those production units currently need to have an energy production of at least 25 GWh a year to become liable to the levy. The threshold was lowered, among others, in 1996 when the charge was extended to smaller plants (output of at least 40 GWh/year), and in 1997 when still more plants had to pay the charge (output of at least 25 GWh/year). The actual levy on NO x emissions was also changed since the NO x charge came into effect: Until the end of 2007, firms had to pay SEK 40 per kilo of emitted NO x . Since early 2008, the rate was increased to SEK 50 per kilo NO x emitted (SEPA 2003; Swedish Energy Agency 2008). The major channel through which NO x emissions are supposed to be reduced is end-of-pipe emission control and innovation in non-physical mitigation technology but also improved energy efficiency (Höglund-Isaksson and Sterner 2009). Besides these pollutant-specific instruments, there are two additional Swedish policy instruments related to energy efficiency improvements that most likely have contributed to reducing emissions of the above air pollutants. These two instruments, which also satisfy Porter's policy criterion of uncertainty reduction to avoid market failures in the context of technology development and adoption, are: The Ordinance on Grants for Measures for an Environmentally-efficient Energy Supply ( 13 The first 5-year period of PFE claims to have been successful: 'low hanging fruit' energy efficiency measures with short average payback periods (less than 1.5 years) were implemented (Stenqvist and Nilsson 2012) .
The introduction and modification of the above economic instruments can be categorized into 12 major policy events overlapping the study period 1999-2011 (see Weiss 2015 for details). 
Data
The empirical analysis uses a sample of the environmentally most hazardous pulp and paper mills in Sweden, observed during the period 1999-2011. The panel is unbalanced, with the number of pulp and paper mills in the sample decreasing continuously after 1999. Table 1 shows the number of pulp and paper mills since 1999 as well as the sample's structural composition.
As can be seen, it is dominated by the most energy and pollution-intensive chemical pulp mills, most of which are integrated. Emission and production data on these ' A-Plants' are published by Swedish Forest Industries and the Swedish EPA's (SEPA) Swedish Pollutant Release and Transfer Register (PRTR).
14,15 PRTR lists emissions from the 1,000 largest companies in Sweden involved in activities considered 'environmentally hazardous' by the Environmental Code. It therefore also includes the pulp and paper ' A-Plants' analyzed in this paper. To gather data on plants' number of employees and production capacity, which were lacking in the above data sources, we used the Nordic Paper and Pulp Makers' Directory (Nordisk Papperskalender 1996 . Due to missing values regarding employees and capacity in these publications, we moreover retrieved Retriever Business, a Swedish online business database as well as firms' annual and environmental reports published on their respective websites. 16 Finally, the data-set contains regional variables at the municipality and functional labor market area level, as well as plant location variables (e.g. town or sea location). We constructed these variables based on data from Statistics Sweden and PRTR, aiming to capture the potential de jure -de facto regulation gap (see Section 2.3), which could manifest itself in the Swedish environmental courts' flexible interpretation of BAT via plant-specific considerations of environmental impacts and economic feasibility as well as in the fact that the operative enforcement and inspection work often is conducted at the region-district level by CABs or municipal authorities.
Variables and descriptive statistics
The key variables in the subsequent empirical analysis are as follows (see also Integrated chemical pulp  1999  63  34  13  15  29  19  2001  60  33  13  14  28  18  2006  54  29  13  12  24  16  2011  48  27  11  10  23  16 3.4.1. Dependent variable For robustness purposes, we construct three alternative dependent variables to proxy the process-based innovation offsets mentioned in Hypotheses 1 to 4. These offsets are measured through changes in plants' energy intensity between years t-1 and t, with energy intensity reductions implying improvements in energy efficiency. We hypothesize that well-designed Swedish regulation of pulp and paper plants' air emissions will induce larger energy intensity reductions at regulated plants vis-à-vis their more leniently, or non-regulated counterparts. The three variables are: the first-differenced logarithm of a plant's total energy use per ton pulp and paper output; the first-differenced logarithm of a plant's use of fuels and thermal energy per ton pulp and paper output; and the first-differenced logarithm of a plant's use of fuels and thermal energy per terajoule (TJ) total energy use. These measures constitute a hybrid between innovation and performance since energy efficiency growth implies an innovation output or 'gains from innovation' measure because it has obvious positive performance effects on the regulated firm via cost savings from energy savings, which result from process reconfigurations (i.e. incremental or radical process innovation) aiming at reducing a plant's energy intensity (Wagner 2003; Brännlund and Lundgren 2009; Ambec et al. 2011; EIO 2010) .
Well-designed environmental regulation
We measure two aspects of well-designed Swedish regulation: stringent but flexible CAC regulation and regulation via flexible economic policy instruments. The former is proxied by the variable CAPEX; an endogenously chosen dummy variable. CAPEX takes the value 1 if a plant expanded production capacity between years t-1 and t, and 0 otherwise. It proxies CAC regulation on the part of Swedish environmental courts, which must approve capacity expansions, usually tightening performance standards in a flexible way via extended compliance periods as a result (Swedish Code of Statutes 1998b; SEPA 2002; OECD 2007) . This, as discussed, provides increased incentives for productive and environmentally-benign process reconfigurations, rather than costly end-of-pipe measures. We expect CAPEX to be positively associated with our process-based innovation offset proxies, which implies a negative hypothesized link between CAPEX and changes in plants' energy intensity: regulated plants (CAPEX = 1) will feature stronger reductions in energy intensity than non-regulated ones (CAPEX = 0). 17 CAPEX is the key regressor for testing Hypotheses 1 and 3. Swedish regulation via economic incentive instruments is modeled through a set of year dummies (D00-D11). These dummies are meant to capture the effect on plants' energy efficiency growth of the 12 major regulatory events in the use of Swedish economic policy instruments since 1999 discussed in Section 3.2. Based on that discussion, the year dummies, each of which is meant to capture at least one of these events, are hypothesized to be negatively related to plants' energy intensity change (i.e. positively related to their process-based innovation offsets in the form of improved energy efficiency) relative to the reference year 2003. That year implies a period of relatively low regulatory stringency and regulation-driven innovation incentives owing to a lack of significant policy events involving 17 due to its binary endogenous nature, CAPEX is at the same time the dependent variable of a so-called selection equation (see section 3.5).
economic instruments (see Figure 3 and Weiss 2015) . 18 The year dummies D00-D11 (minus D03; the reference year) are key regressors for testing Hypotheses 2 and 4.
Control variables for Swedish CAC regulation
In addition, we include several control variables for stringency of Swedish CAC regulation which in principle could also affect plants' innovation offsets in the form of energy efficiency improvements. These controls complement the single policy event measures describes above, which may be impaired by the de jure -de facto regulation gap (see Section 2.3). In Swedish CAC regulation, this can occur due to the environmental courts' flexible interpretation of BAT via a consideration of plant-specific environmental impacts and economic feasibility (see Section 3.2). A second potential source of the de jure -de facto deviation is the decentralized operative enforcement of Swedish CAC regulation. In decentralized systems of environmental governance, medium to long-term dynamic efficiency and 'win-win' objectives of national environmental legislation may compete with goals articulated by regional or local governance levels -which might be at odds with their national counterparts. Recent literature findings confirm this alleged trade-off. For example, it has been suggested that decentralized environmental governance may lead to regulatory bias and efficiency losses (Oates and Schwab 1988; Oates 1999 Oates , 2002 . Also, anecdotal evidence has been provided that environmental inspectors at the municipality level have been exposed to political pressure to make the municipality appear more business friendly (Sjöberg 2012) . With respect to the PH, we therefore expect a flawed coordination between different regulatory levels to be detrimental to inducing innovation offsets at all regulated plants.
Our first control variable in that context is Green. It measures, in year t, the Green Party's share in the Municipal Council Election in the Swedish municipality where plant i is located.
19 Through this variable, we control for the PH's suggestion that effective regulator-regulator coordination is needed to stimulate innovation offsets at regulated firms. Green is meant to proxy efficiency losses through regulatory bias due to decentralized elements in Swedish CAC regulation, for example, by entailing a discriminatory treatment of plants with otherwise equal characteristics (e.g. size). In line with the PH's postulation, such a coordination failure should be detrimental to innovation offsets at affected firms. Under the assumption that an increase in Green is equivalent to an increased risk of coordination failure between stringent national and less stringent regional elements of Swedish environmental policy (i.e. in those municipalities where Green is lower), plants located in municipalities where Green is higher might feature larger energy efficiency growth than those located in municipalities where Green is lower.
Besides, we include includes three additional proxies for stringency of CAC regulation, both by environmental courts and by local administrative bodies responsible for inspection and enforcement. All variables are supposed to reflect varying stringency due to variations in the sensitivity of the local environment in which the plants in the data-set are embedded. As mentioned, one aspect of plant specificity in Swedish CAC regulation is that the degree of regulatory stringency to which a plant is exposed hinges upon its local environmental impact. To ensure environmental efficiency, plants with a larger local environmental
19
Information on a plant's home municipality was obtained from Prtr. 18 the only potential negative effect could be expected from Event 12; the 57-percent fall in the Co 2 /energy tax on fossil fuels in 2011. However, since this event was overlapping other events (see Figure 3) , the net effect is difficult to predict.
footprint, all else equal, must be regulated more strictly than those inflicting less damage on the local environment. This approach is mirrored in the Swedish BAT principle of proportionality which, in turn, has its roots in the 'Polluter Pays Principle' embodied in the Swedish Environmental Code's rules of consideration (Swedish Code of Statutes 1998a). We operationalize the notion of 'sensitivity of the local environment' in two ways. we assume that this sensitivity is an increasing function of a Swedish municipality's (i) vegetation and ecosystem density, and (ii) share of protected land area.
The latter is captured in the variable Pta, which denotes, for year t, the ratio between the protected and total land area in the municipality where pulp and paper mill i is located. 20 We expect that an increase in Pta goes along with a tightening of regulatory standards because environmental courts, in accordance with the Environmental Code's general rules of consideration, will want to impose stricter environmental standards on mills located close to such protected areas. We expect the operative enforcement to be stricter as well. Hence, we predict that plants located in in municipalities where Pta is higher will realize larger regulation-induced innovation offsets in the form of energy efficiency improvements than plants located in municipalities where Pta is lower. In terms of vegetation and ecosystem density, we define two variables; Pode and TOWN. Pode measures, for year t, the population density in municipality m where plant i is located. TOWN takes on 1 if plant i is located within an agglomerated area, and 0 otherwise. 21 We conjecture that the lower Pode, the higher the vegetation and ecosystem density, that is, the higher the relative sensitivity of the environment. This in turn implies an increase in regulatory stringency vis-à-vis those plants located in such relatively sensitive environments. Likewise, we expect plants located within urban agglomerations (i.e. TOWN = 1) to be regulated more leniently relative to plants outside agglomerations (i.e. TOWN = 0) because a town's vegetation and ecosystem density is lower. Hence, we expect innovation offsets in the form of energy efficiency improvements at plants located in more densely populated areas (in towns) to be lower than those at plants in less populated areas (outside towns).
Control variable for Swedish CAC regulation and plant characteristics
Finally, we include ln(Size), the logarithm of a plant's number of employees in year t, as control. This variable, on the one hand, is supposed to capture plant features that may matter in an innovation and productivity context. For example, large firms, due to harnessing scale economies and general internal resources, are said to be more productive, and probably also more innovative, than smaller ones. On the other, it should be correlated with, and thus reflect, regulatory stringency. We expect large plants to be more strictly regulated than smaller plants. First, regarding CAC regulation, the authorities will tend to enforce the Polluter Pays Principle, forcing larger plants to internalize their larger environmental footprint. Second, since economic feasibility matters for Swedish BAT, the fact that it will be less expensive for larger plants to reduce emissions per ton output may imply that they will face more stringent regulatory conditions. In terms of regulation via economic instruments, larger plants, due to their ability to reduce emissions more cost-efficiently than smaller 20 the protected land area is composed of a municipality's areas declared as national park, nature reserve, nature management areas, wildlife sanctuaries, and habitat protection areas. decisions concerning the establishment of national parks are made by the swedish government and the swedish Parliament the other types of protected area are established by the CaBs or the Municipalities. statistics sweden (2013). "Miljöräkenskaper. " retrieved February 6, 2013, from www.scb.se. 21 the variable was constructed using cartographic data found in Prtr.
plants, may also have a higher incentive to respond to such instruments (e.g. improve on their environmental performance instead of paying a pollution tax). We therefore expect innovation offsets at larger plants in the form of energy efficiency improvements to be larger relative to those at smaller plants.
Variables in the selection equation
As mentioned above, and as discussed further in Section 3.5, the potential endogeneity of CAPEX requires including a selection equation in the empirical framework. We include several variables in this equation to explain the variation in CAPEX; its dependent variable. Our basic conjecture is that more strictly regulated plants, ceteris paribus, are less likely to expand capacity, because the provisions imposed by the regulatory authorities in that context will tend to be tougher and costlier to implement than in the case of less regulated plants expanding capacity. Pode and TOWN are two covariates of the selection equation. Hence, we would expect a negative effect of Pode on CAPEX, while the effect of TOWN on CAPEX is unclear: On the one hand, one could expect a positive effect to less stringent regulation of plants located in towns. On the other, there might be a counterbalancing effect: Mills located within urbanized areas, for noise reasons, could also face more stringent regulations in the form of lower maximum production limits compared to plants outside towns. In other words, they might as well be less likely to obtain the authorities' permission to expand capacity.
22 Pta is also part of the selection equation. Since we expect a positive correlation between Pta and regulatory stringency, we expect plants located in municipalities with a high Pta, all else equal, to be less likely to expand production capacity. Size is another covariate of the selection equation. Just like in the case of Pta, we expect a positive correlation between Size and regulatory stringency. In contrast to the above case, however, we conjecture that even though large plants face tighter regulation, they are still more likely to expand capacity (i.e. to get the approval to do so). The reason is that we expect large plants to have a higher 'ability' (e.g. financial and human resources, abatement know-how), and this ability should translate into an enhanced propensity to increase production capacity, as well as an enhanced likelihood to obtain the permission from the environmental courts to do so. Finally, we include two exclusion restrictions, that is, covariates that only are part of the selection equation but not of the outcome equation (cf. Section 3.5). First, COAST is a dummy variable taking the value of 1 if plant i is located by the coast, and 0 if not. 23 We conjecture that coast location constitutes a less environmentally sensitive area than inland location, for instance, because effluents tend to be released in the sea, and not into more sensitive inland waters (SEPA 2002) . If this is true, regulators will impose more lenient standards on plants that are located nearby the coast than on those that are not. Less regulated plants in turn will be more likely to expand capacity, because of laxer and less costly provisions imposed by the regulatory authorities.
24 Second, NO x /Fos measures plant i's NO x emissions per TJ fossil fuels. 25 Very much in line with our reasoning regarding the Size
22
Limited space could be a further reason why capacity expansions at those plants are less likely. a study visit, in 2012, at Munksjö aB, a paper manufacturer in Jönköping, showed that these conjectures may indeed hold for plants within (tightly) agglomerated areas.
23
the variable was constructed using cartographic data found in Prtr.
24
In principle, COAST would also have been a candidate for the outcome equation. However, after thorough consideration, I decided to use it as exclusion restriction instead. 25 We also tested alternative variables involving Co 2 and sulfur instead of no x . While the results are similar, the advantage with nox/Fos is the larger number of observations (around 70), which improves the consistency of the estimation.
variable, we assume that plants with a better (i.e. lower) pollution intensity, all else equal, will be more likely to get regulatory approval to expand capacity because they signal that they in the past successfully managed to implement environmental improvement measures. Table A -2 summarizes the predicted effects of the variables used in the analysis. Moreover, Tables A-3 and A-4 report descriptive statistics and pairwise correlations of the sample.
Empirical strategy
To examine the relationship between well-designed regulation and innovation offsets at pulp and paper plants in the form of energy efficiency improvements, we choose a treatmenteffects model. It permits testing the effect of an endogenously chosen binary treatment, z it on a continuous variable, conditional on two sets of exogenous variables x it and w it . (Cameron and Trivedi 2009; Guo and Fraser 2010; StataCorp 2011) . 26 Our main interest is in the regression model ('outcome equation') where z it is an endogenous dummy variable indicating whether the treatment for unit i is assigned or not in year t. The binary decision to obtain the treatment, z it , is modelled as the outcome of an unobserved latent variable, z * it . By assumption, z * it is a linear function of the exogenous regressors w it and a random component u it ('selection equation'). Formally, where the observed decision is and where and u are bivariate normal with mean zero and covariance matrix
In the present paper, the treatment effects model allows for testing the effect of a dummy variable z it , proxying well-designed CAC regulation of a given pulp and paper plant based on tightened but flexible environmental performance standards in the context of carrying out production capacity expansions, on a continuous dependent variable, y it , where y it measures changes in energy intensity at pulp and paper plant i during the years t-1 and t. This dummy takes the value of 1 if a plant i has expanded production capacity between years t-1 and t, and the value of 0 otherwise. Environmental courts' tightening of expanding plants' performance standards in the context of approving a capacity expansion, however, can be expected to take place with a delay due to courts' use of extended compliance periods. In our regressions, we account for such periods by introducing a one-year lag between our binary CAC proxy and the respective dependent variable. The same one-year lag is applied to the (1)
the exogenous variables pertaining to these sets can in principle be identical, however, it would be preferable to have some exclusion restrictions. this means that at least one exogenous variable of the x i set should not appear in the w i set, on a priori grounds. Identical variables in the selection and outcome equation would result in imprecise estimates (Wooldridge 2002). year dummies capturing regulation via economic instruments to model the possibility of plants adjusting to the respective regulatory events with a one-year delay. 27 The one-year lag implemented is deemed appropriate because it should not be too long to ensure the predictive power of the regulatory proxies. Moreover, the one-year lag reflects a reasonable guess in terms of the duration of compliance periods granted by the regulatory authorities.
We opt for the treatment effects model because we conjecture that in our case there are unobserved factors determining a plant's decision to expand production capacity, and the regulator's propensity to approve that expansion, respectively. This implies a sample selection bias. For example, one could argue that a plant's probability of successfully and efficiently adopting or developing new environmental technology to improve its environmental and business performance is considered when it comes to a production capacity expansion: on the one hand by the plant's management (e.g. modernization costs given the plant's age, human resources available), and, on the other, by the environmental courts (e.g. relationship of trust with the plant management due to successful environmental performance improvements in the context of past capacity expansion approvals). Hence, plants with higher, say, ability, would be more likely to expand capacity, improve air emission intensities, and realize innovation offsets.
Moreover, if the error term in equation (2) is correlated with ability, and the error term in equation (1) as well, there will be a positive correlation between these error terms. In this way, the selection bias is identical with an omitted-variable problem -which is why the common OLS estimator needs to be replaced by a treatment effects model to correct for the upward bias otherwise caused (StataCorp 2011). The capacity expansion dummy can hence be considered an endogenously chosen binary treatment -which makes it necessary to explicitly model selection effects by means of a treatment-effects approach when modelling innovation and performance outcomes at Swedish pulp and paper plants (Guo and Fraser 2010) . We proxy a plant's ability, among others, by plant size, modelling a plant's decision to expand production capacity (or rather the corresponding regulatory approval) as a function of this variable in the selection equation. Plant ability is captured by the exogenous variable set w it . The exogenous variable set, x it , includes further proxies for 'well-designed' regulation in the Porterian sense.
Results
Estimation issues
Several estimation issues need to be considered. First, there is a potential endogeneity problem related to the treatment effects estimator. The treatment effects model is justified only if the error terms it and u it of the outcome and selection equation are correlated (cf. Section 3.5). In other words, if the treatment effects estimator is to be used, to avoid estimation bias, both equations must not be independent. STATA conducts a Likelihood Ratio (LR) test of independent equations to determine whether , the critical parameter in that context, is equal to zero. The LR test compares the joint likelihood of an independent probit model for the selection equation, and a regression model on the observed outcomes against the 27 one could in principle also expect plants to anticipate regulatory events, which econometrically would involve creating lead variables; in this case a one-year lead for the regulatory proxies. this however is not done in the present paper, constituting a study limitation. treatment effects model likelihood (Guo and Fraser 2010) . If = 0, then the errors it and u it are independent and an endogeneity problem can be ruled out; that is, CAPEX would not be an endogenously chosen binary treatment (Cameron and Trivedi 2009) .
Moreover, we face a potential endogeneity problem with regard to the plant-level regressors: In all specifications, we lag the plant-level exogenous regressors ln (Size) and NO x /Fos in order to reduce reverse causality and simultaneity biases (Wooldridge 2002) . Reverse causality could be present, on the one hand, in the selection equation: A plant expanding capacity might (i) increase or even reduce (downsizing) its staff ex post; and (ii) improve on its environmental efficiency (measured by NO x /Fos) ex post. Moreover, there might be reverse causality issues in the outcome equation. For example, a plant improving its energy efficiency in the context of a capacity expansion, again, might increase or reduce its staff ex post. Similarly, one might expect a positive effect of improvements in a plant's energy efficiency between years t-1 and t on the likelihood of that plant carrying out a production capacity expansion through obtaining the approval to do so by the authorities in year t, probably again because of a higher financial or human resource ability embodied in such an efficiency improvement and, and because energy efficiency improvements during years t-1 and t should send credible signals to the regulators in terms of the plant management's professionalism and ability to implement additional air emission reduction measures via energy efficiency improvements should the capacity expansion be approved (see Section 3.4). 28 The fact that we implement CAPEX also with a one-year lag -to model the PH's dynamic effects -helps reduce this reverse causality issue.
Simultaneity biases, too, may be present in the selection and outcome equation. As for the former, firms might anticipate (unobserved) demand shocks affecting CAPEX, and adjust plant size at the same time. Regarding the outcome equation, unobserved changes in customers' environmental consciousness may increase demands for a reduced environmental footprint on the part of pulp and paper firms, affecting plants' energy efficiency and staff size (e.g. due to downsizing in the context of efficiency improvement measures).
In addition, we face a clustering issue: Our specifications involve regressing a plantlevel dependent variable on explanatory variables at the region level (Green, Pta, Pode etc.) . This implies that the usual assumption of independent observations may be violated; observations will most likely be independent across regions (clusters) but not necessarily within regions. we account for this by clustering the standard errors at the region-level, i.e. the municipality level, so that they allow for intragroup correlation. This procedure has impacts on the standard errors and variance-covariance matrix of the estimators but not the coefficient estimates. 29 Next, we cut off extreme values for each dependent variable to ensure they do not steer the results. In that context, we make use of a Q-Q plot, which plots the quantiles of the dependent variable in question against the quantiles of the normal distribution. Those observations that to a major extent deviate from the normal distribution are not included in the regressions. A final estimation issue we account for are two exclusion restrictions (COAST and NO x /Fos), which are part of the selection equation but not of the outcome equation (see also Section 3.5).
28
We thank an anonymous reviewer for this valuable suggestion.
29
It is noteworthy that with a small number of clusters (usually below 50), or very unbalanced cluster sizes, inference using the cluster-robust estimator may be incorrect (nichols and schaffer 2007). I have around 50 clusters, which moreover are fairly balanced in terms of size.
CAC regulation and process-based innovation offsets
Table reports regression results for innovation offsets at Swedish pulp and paper millsproxied by changes in fuel and thermal energy efficiency -that are hypothesized to be induced by well-designed CAC regulation through environmental courts approving plant capacity expansions. We also include plants' changes in total energy efficiency, although this parameter is somewhat less relevant from an environmental viewpoint.
30
The regression results for the six models presented in Table 2 below involve specifications for CAPEX without lag and with a one-year lag to allow for the PH's dynamic nature as well as for the potential reverse causality issue outlined in Section 4.1. The statistically highly significant CAPEX coefficients in all six specifications, except for Model 1, provide robust evidence in favor of the PH and its dynamics: An increase in regulatory stringency (CAPEX = 1), all else equal, is associated with energy efficiency growth at the regulated plants that is significantly larger than that of the less strictly regulated plants (CAPEX = 0). These findings are supportive of Hypothesis 1. The regulatory effect kicks in directly after capacity expansions, and continues during another year, as suggested by Models 2, 4 and 6, which provides robust evidence of Hypothesis 3. Only Model 1 deviates from this pattern, displaying a positive coefficient for CAPEX, which indicates that CAC regulation does not trigger immediate improvements in overall energy efficiency. This can be due to uncertainty-reducing probation periods aimed at ensuring that plants get the time and flexibility needed to adopt energy-efficient technologies and optimize their use via learning effects. Moreover, since the immediate effect regarding CAPEX in Models 3 and 5 is negative, the positive CAPEX-coefficient in Model 1 may also have to do with plants' increased electricity demand directly after a capacity expansion, which is monitored less by the authorities.
In terms of marginal effects, Models 3 to 6 indicate that, depending on the exact specification, median growth in expanding plants' (CAPEX = 1) fuel and thermal energy efficiency was between 38 and 62% higher than that of non-expanding plants (CAPEX = 0). Models 1 and 2 show that relative growth in expanding plants' total energy efficiency was less pronounced, probably due to the dampening effect of an increased consumption of electricity after expanding capacity: median growth one year after expanding capacity was between 11% higher than that of non-expanding plants, and median growth immediately after capacity expansions even was 10% lower compared with non-expanding plants. Comparing the marginal effects of the respective zero-and one-year lag models, an interesting finding is that expanding plants' relative energy efficiency growth was lowest directly after capacity expansions, accelerating one year later. This again suggests that, in line with Hypothesis 3, process reconfigurations need time to materialize, with the regulatory authorities probably having a role in stimulating this process via extended compliance periods.
The above results are based on conservative cut-off points. The model diagnostics for Models 1 and 2 resulted in cut-off points that involved dropping the 3.7% most extreme observations from the sample. In Models 3 and 4 (5 and 6), we dropped the 0.5% (0.6%) most extreme observations to ensure they do not steer the results. this is because it includes the PPI's purchased electricity, which is not of major importance for the regulatory authorities. nevertheless, since total energy use is dominated by use of fuel and thermal energy, it might still be useful to include this indicator. Purchased electricity makes up around 75% of the PPI's net electricity consumption (see Weiss 2015) . 31 those observations that to a major extent deviate from the normal distribution, illustrated via a Q-Q plot, are not included in the regressions (see section 4.1). I also ran the regressions including these outliers. the main results, which are unchanged, are available from the author upon request. Table 2 . regression results for energy efficiency growth at swedish pulp and paper plants notes: the sample period is 1999-2011. the time-variant regressors in the selection and outcome equations are lagged by one period with respect to the respective dependent variable. the base year for the year dummies is 2003. Coast and no x /Fos are exclusion restrictions. the models are estimated using the maximum likelihood estimator. Cluster-robust standard errors (at the municipality level) in parentheses. the Lr test of independent equations is rejected in all models, which justifies using the treatment effects estimator. *p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01. 
Robustness checks
We conduct robustness checks in relation to CAPEX. 32 Our first tests involve maintaining the cutoff point while specifying CAPEX with a two-year lag. For total energy efficiency growth, the results yield a positive and statistically significant CAPEX-coefficient: Expanding plants' median growth of total energy efficiency two years after capacity expansion was 11% lower than that of non-expanding plants at the same point in time; a finding in line with that from Model 1, which would imply a rejection of Hypothesis 3. Results for growth in fuel and thermal energy efficiency based on CAPEX lagged by two years now also show some evidence of a negative effect of CAC regulation: The specification using ∆ln(FuTh/ Energy) as dependent variable suggests that median growth in expanding plants' fuel and thermal energy efficiency was 42% lower two years after expanding capacity than that of non-expanding plants at the same point in time, whereas the model involving ∆ln(FuTh/Y) provided insignificant results. This again is not in line with Hypothesis 3.
To build further confidence in the regression results, we re-specify CAPEX with zero, one and two lags, this time including extreme observations. 33 The previous result patterns are confirmed, with the marginal effects increasing in magnitude. As for total energy efficiency growth, the oscillating pattern remains: expanding plants' median growth of total energy efficiency when compared with that of non-expanding plants was 15% lower directly after capacity expansions, 13% higher one year later, and 16% lower two years later. Regarding growth in fuel and thermal energy efficiency, expanding plants' median increase in that indicator, relative to non-expanding plants, was 40 to 42% higher immediately after capacity expansions and 47 to 49% higher one year later. Expanding plants' median growth after two years, however, again was significantly (between 65 and 68%) lower than that of their non-expanding counterparts. Both findings are at odds with Hypothesis 3.
At the same time, there are arguments for why the conclusion to reject Hypothesis 3 based on these robustness checks might be premature because interpreting these not completely straightforward regression results is somewhat tricky. One conceivable explanation involves, in a first step, recalling of which variables the PPI's total energy use as well as fuel and thermal energy use are composed. While the latter is largely made up of biofuel consumption, and less and less fossil fuel consumption, total energy use is determined by fuel and thermal energy use (and hence primarily biofuel consumption) as well as electricity use (mostly purchased).
Against that backdrop, a plausible reason for why expanding plants' relative fuel and thermal energy efficiency growth is higher within the first year, and lower two years after capacity expansions is that they first could focus on reducing fossil fuel consumption by embarking on immediate improvement measures related to fuel and thermal energy efficiency. Parallel to that, they increasingly resort to clean biofuel-based technology innovation (see Weiss 2015) .
As argued, such process reconfigurations potentially require a longer time horizon, benefitting from extended compliance periods granted by the regulator. Biofuels tend to worsen plants' energy efficiency record because their purchase price is low and environmentally benign. 34 Still, it would be misleading to interpret expanding plants' lower relative growth
34
In the case of chemical pulp mills, which constitute a large share of our sample, they are even free by-products of production. in fuel and thermal energy efficiency two years after capacity expansions as evidence against CAC regulation's ability to induce innovation offsets in line with Hypothesis 3. Clean biofuel-based technologies themselves imply innovation offsets due to biofuels' low-cost nature. By contrast, the fact that, on top of that, expanding plants' growth in total energy efficiency directly after capacity expansions is lower than that of non-expanding plants could be explained by an increased use of electricity due to expanding capacity -which can cripple total energy efficiency growth. Finally, it must be noted that implementing a two-year lag might increase the odds of reducing the predictive power of the CAC regulatory proxies relative to the one-year lag, which is deemed more appropriate in that context. To sum up, we find evidence for Hypotheses 1 and 3 that well-designed CAC regulations via performance standards induce process-based innovation offsets at regulated plants -immediately or with a one-year delay.
Regulation through economic instruments and process-based innovation offsets
Our findings, reported in Table 2 , for the year dummies D00-D11 show highly statistically significant coefficients in Models 3 to 6 during most of the years studied (i.e. 2000, 2004, 2005, 2007, 2009-2011) , but almost none in Models 1 and 2. This can be interpreted as that Swedish regulatory events, since 1999, in the use of economic incentive instruments tended to induce process-based innovation offsets in the form of improved fuel and thermal energy efficiency at Swedish pulp and paper plants. These efficiency improvements were probably realized to reduce plants' specific use of fossil fuels (see Section 3.2). The largely insignificant results in Models 1 and 2, by contrast, might result from the fact that total energy efficiency is more strongly determined by plants' specific use of purchased electricity (i.e. electricity efficiency), which is not regulated and therefore should not be responsive to the events in the use of Swedish economic incentive instruments (see Weiss 2015 for further details.).
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First, the negative and statistically highly significant coefficients for D00 in Models 3 to 6 indicate that mills' growth in fuel and thermal energy efficiency was significantly larger during 1999-2000 than during the base year 2002-2003 -a period of relatively low regulatory stringency (see Section 3.4). This can have been caused by the upcoming Event 3, and here in particular the 230-percent rise in the CO 2 tax on natural gas, which may have induced investments in plants' energy efficiency to reduce specific use of fossil fuels (i.e. natural gas).
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The year 2003-2004 marks the beginning of a favorable period in terms of the PPI's air emission performance (see Figure 2) . Weiss (2015) argues that this trend was significantly influenced by Swedish economic incentive instruments, most notably Event 5 (ECS), Event 6 (government grants for a clean an efficient energy supply), and Event 7 (ETS). The fact that the PPI's air pollution expenditure relative to total output rose dramatically between 2003 and 2005 provides a first indication of this causal relationship (Ibid.). The negative and statistically highly significant coefficients for D04 in all six models suggest that this environmentally benign transition was fueled by energy efficiency growth, particularly growth
35
By contrast, electricity produced on-site using fossil fuels is subject to those economic incentive instruments. It however only accounts for about 25% of plants' total electricity demand (see Weiss 2015) . 36 substantial increases in the purchase price of fossil fuels during 1999-2000 can also have played a role (Weiss 2015) .
of fuel and thermal energy efficiency, as evidenced by the larger effect sizes in Models 3 to 6 relative to Models 1 and 2. This process continued in 2005 as indicated by the negative and statistically significant D05-coefficients in Models 3 to 6, although substantial increases in the price of fossil fuels can have been a contributing factor (see Weiss 2015) .
The statistically highly significant dummies for D07 and D09 in Models 3 to 6 confirm that plants' median growth of fuel and thermal energy efficiency during that period continued to be significantly larger than that during the base year [2002] [2003] . Event 9 (25-percent rise in the NO x charge) and Event 10 (Phase II of ETS) as well as the regulatory events already in force (notably Events 5 and 6) can have been major contributing factors in that context, not least because the average price for fossil fuels dropped during those two years (cf. Weiss 2015.) . Another noteworthy fact is that the magnitude of the D07 coefficients is way larger than that of the D09 coefficients. This suggests that the events affecting the 2006-2007 growth in fuel and thermal energy efficiency (most likely Events 9 and 10) were very effective in inducing this outcome. To sum up, our findings regarding the year dummies in Models 3 to 6 provide evidence of Hypothesis 2 such that economic incentive instruments induce process-based innovation offsets at regulated plants. The overall positive link between these dummies and plants' energy efficiency growth, shown in Models 4 and 6, moreover lends support to Hypothesis 4 such that the instruments' effect on process-based innovation offsets at regulated plants is dynamic.
In terms of control variables, the results in Table 2 do not provide evidence that plants' energy efficiency growth is positively affected by an increased local political influence by the Green Party, which, as argued, is assumed to imply higher regulatory stringency regarding CAC inspection and enforcement at the local level compared with more business-friendly parties. Hence, our empirical results cannot back up our initial conjecture that the lower the Green Party's local weight, the more difficult it becomes to align the medium to long-term dynamic efficiency and 'win-win' objectives of national CAC regulation with potentially conflicting political goals (e.g. secure jobs in the short run, general business friendliness) at the local level. Likewise, Pode, TOWN and Pta, our other control variables for CAC regulation, turned out to be insignificant in virtually all specifications. By contrast, the coefficients for ln(Size) tended to be positive and statistically highly significant, suggesting that energy efficiency at larger plants improved at a significantly slower rate than that at smaller plants. This is contrary to our expectations, but might be explained by the fact that larger plants already are very (environmentally) efficient, so that not least the regulatory authorities have an interest in making smaller plants catch up in terms of efficiency relative to their larger counterparts. Regarding the selection equation, the results suggest that CAPEX is an endogenously determined binary treatment. First, ln(Size) is statistically highly significant 37 another reason might be that, during 2006-2007, the industry saw a major expansion of production capacity, which can have entailed energy efficiency growth as well (cf. Weiss 2015) .
in almost all specifications. Moreover, we find weak evidence that, as expected, plants in more protected areas are less likely to expand production capacity (cf. Models 1 and 4).
Discussion and conclusions
This paper provided an empirical test of the Porter hypothesis (PH). The PH postulates that stringent and well-designed environmental regulations can induce 'innovation offsets' for polluting industries, by stimulating the adoption of clean production technologies, which can both entail economic benefits for the regulated firm and improve environmental quality. Porter argues that environmental regulations are well-designed when they are stringent, avoid uncertainty and are predictable, flexible and coordinated. We tested the above proposition -excluding an explicit focus on the 'coordination' property (see Section 1) -for a sample of energy and air pollution-intensive pulp and paper plants in Sweden; a country known for its well-designed environmental regulations in the spirit of Porter. The results, on the one hand, confirm that Swedish environmental regulation in the form of stringent CAC regulation based on flexible performance standards, and economic incentive instruments has induced process-based innovation offsets at regulated plants. This applies particularly to CAC regulation, which most likely makes use of flexible time strategies, for example, in the form of probation periods for new technologies granted to the regulated plants. These offsets materialize through improvements in fuel and thermal energy efficiency. While not measurable, our underlying assumption is that energy efficiency growth occurs due to process reconfigurations or rather incremental or radical process innovation.
Implications and limitations
Our results have valuable implications. Theory wise, they feed into the environmental economics literature, confirming claims regarding the positive dynamic incentives given by announced regulation based on extended compliance and phase-in periods as well as flexible and uncertainty-reducing economic incentive instruments such as pollution taxes and charges (Requate 2005; Kemp and Pontoglio 2011) . The results moreover corroborate the scarcely explored 'narrow' version of the PH (Koźluk and Zipperer 2015; Albrizio, Kozluk, and Zipperer 2017) , tests of which involve investigating whether variables specifically measuring 'well-designed' regulatory instruments yield positive performance outcomes (Jaffe and Palmer 1997) . On that basis, and in line with Ambec et al. (2011) and Broberg et al. (2013) , it can be concluded that empirical tests of the PH that do not account for its dynamic nature, and that do not measure 'well-designed' regulations, might provide misleading conclusions as to its validity -which has been questioned by past research.
In terms of policy implications, the results suggest that well-designed environmental regulations can simultaneously induce deep air emission reductions (see Figure 2) and innovation offsets at regulated plants. As the analysis revealed, this applies not only for economic instruments, but also for CAC regulation based on flexible performance standards. This latter finding is contrary to the mainstream literature on environmental policy effectiveness that economic instruments provide stronger dynamic incentives than CAC instruments (Perman et al. 2003; Requate 2005) . It is also at odds with Albrizio, Kozluk, and Zipperer (2017) who find market-based environmental policies to be more productivity-friendly than non-market instruments. Our result is more in line with Kemp and Pontoglio (2011) , who argue that the alleged superiority of economic instruments may hold for incremental low-cost innovations but not for radical innovation. We take our finding that median growth in capacity-expanding plants' fuel and thermal energy efficiency was between 38 and 62% higher than that of non-expanding plants as indication that CAC regulation based on performance standards is suitable for inducing radical process-based innovation, and process offsets, at polluting plants. Our results also yield implications for managers of regulated firms: They could, for example, raise awareness that environmental regulation is not necessarily costly for polluting firms but can induce firms to reconfigure their production processes to eliminate inefficiencies not only in terms of environmental impact but also in economic terms (Lanoie, Laurent-Lucchetti, and Johnstone 2011) .
The study is not without limitations. First, while we find evidence of regulation-induced process-based innovation offsets at plants, we could not test whether Swedish regulation was able to stimulate overall productivity improvements at these plantsmeasured, for example, through total factor productivity growth -or whether regulation had a crowding-out effect (Brännlund and Lundgren 2010) . In other words, while regulation-based innovation offsets seem to be present, it cannot be ruled out that these offsets do not -or only after a long payback period -exceed the cost of complying with them. Future studies could investigate this issue in more detail. Second, the generalizability of the results is limited, on the one hand, because of studying plants within one specific industry (the PPI) belonging to one specific country (Sweden), and on the other, because of focusing the analysis on the most energy and pollution-intensive pulp and paper plants, the so-called ' A-Plants' (cf. Section 3.4). Future studies could base their tests of the effectiveness of well-designed environmental regulation on a larger and richer plant-level sample in terms of industry and country composition. Third, our panel is unbalanced because there are plants in the sample that did not survive the sample period 1999-2011. Under the assumption that they left the market due to regulation being too strong, excluding these firms from the analysis could introduce an upward bias in estimating the effect of regulation.
38 Estimation bias could moreover result from the fact that our exclusion restrictions are not significant; another study limitation. Fourth, for data constraints, we were unable to control for changes in the price of fossil fuels in the analysis. This obviously also has a major impact on plants' decisions to improve on energy efficiency. Fifth, we did not control for capacity reductions (e.g. due to downsizing measures) at those plants, which, too, can affect the dependent variables used in the empirical analysis. This would have posed additional challenges regarding the econometric strategy, given that capacity reductions can be viewed as another endogenous binary treatment variable. Finally, a continuous treatment variable, which would also account for the magnitude of the capacity expansion, might have been preferable because the dummy variable (CAPEX) implies that a minimum expansion is treated in the same way as a major one, which is limiting. 39 38 I thank an anonymous reviewer for this valuable comment. one solution could have been to only include plants that survived the whole sample period. this, however, would have entailed a drop of consistency in the estimations.
39
I thank an anonymous reviewer for this valuable comment. the choice of the dummy, however, was unavoidable due to methodological constraints: stata's treatment effects estimator requires a binary treatment variable. 
